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THE THOMAS HEARINGS, CONFIRMATIONS
AND CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS
THEODORE B. OLSON*
The tortured and surreal manner in which the Senate of the
United States mishandled the confirmation of Clarence Thomas
as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court will be
analyzed, debated, and remembered for decades. Unfortunately,
although it was the most dramatic, the Clarence Thomas episode
was just the latest in a series of searing experiences in which our
system for selecting judges and executive branch officials has been
transformed into a savage ritual calculated to maim, malign and
embitter the persons selected to provide leadership in the United
States. The long list of victims include Ray Donovan, Brad Reyn-
olds, William Rehnquist, Robert Bork, Doug Ginsberg and John
Tower, but there have been many more. I know of no nation in
the world that has developed such a sadistic and cannibalistic sys-
tem for handicapping the individuals selected for leadership roles,
that engages in such a calculated and apparently mindless cam-
paign to diminish confidence in government and its officials and
institutions, and that so thoroughly discourages those who might
otherwise be willing to sacrifice their time, career, fortunes and
families for public service.
Our only hope is that the Clarence Thomas experience will be a
turning point in American history, because it revealed with unfor-
gettable clarity to the American people how the process has been
politicized, debased and perverted. Now is the time to take advan-
tage of that revelation and inspire the public to take steps to stop
these unconscionable attacks on the men and women who are con-
sidered for positions of leadership in this country and the concom-
itant poisoning of our system of governance.
In describing what the process has become, we must first recog-
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nize what it is not. In this era of divided government, with a Sen-
ate controlled by a political party opposed to the President's poli-
cies and antagonistic to his successes, it is misleading to call what
we have just experienced a "confirmation process." A substantial
block of Senators have powerful incentives to prevent the Presi-
dent's nominees from being placed on the courts or in positions of
executive power because the persons he selects are not going to
make decisions that will be appreciated by the Howard
Metzenbaums, Edward Kennedys or Paul Simons of the Senate or
the people who keep them in office. Those Senators just do not
want these individuals confirmed under any circumstances and
they will do whatever they can get away with politically to prevent
the confirmation from occurring. Therefore, to call it a "confir-
mation process" is to accept the canard that this is part of a con-
structive process leading toward confirmation. It is not. It is part
of a mechanism being misused by a substantial number of Sena-
tors for the singular purpose of preventing confirmation. As Presi-
dent Bush once said, "They aim to destroy lives and wreck
reputations. '
Therefore, perhaps we ought to describe this system as the "re-
jection process." However, while the result is not always rejection,
when the opposing forces are in full cry, it is invariably a damag-
ing, debilitating experience. The candidate is either defeated or,
at minimum, suffers some form of psychic, emotional or reputa-
tional injury in the process of being confirmed. Therefore, we
could also call this the "destruction process" or, more explicitly,
the "Senate destruction process."
How does the Senate destruction process work? Consider some
of the examples that we have experienced over the last ten years
and a relatively clear picture of the strategy and mechanics
emerge. The process can be broken down into seven principal
elements:
1. Prolongation. As President Bush pointed out, the time the
process takes is four times longer today than it was in the
Remarks by President George Bush at the Smithsonian Institute, National Museum of
American History, Washington, D.C., Oct. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
Fednew File.
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time of President Kennedy.2 In fact, the process for Supreme
Court nominees is considerably faster than for other posi-
tions. For Clarence Thomas, the torture and uncertainty
lasted three and one-half months. For others it is six months
or more-sometimes more than a year. The delay serves sev-
eral purposes. It discourages nominees and disrupts their
lives. It is enervating to the White House and tends to dissi-
pate the President's support and enthusiasm-particularly
the support of White House staff who must provide continu-
ing comfort and aid to the nominee, but who have many re-
sponsibilities and whose attention might be diluted if it must
be divided among many people over a sustained interval.
Most importantly, delay gives opponents time to amass forces
and assemble information harmful to the nominee.
2. Inquisition. What could be worse than the civil litigation
discovery process? But that monster has been taken to new
heights by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Committee
demands copies of virtually every document ever written or
spoken by the nominee or by others under his jurisdiction.
Even diaries and telephone logs are requested. In Clarence
Thomas's case this apparently consisted of 32,000 pages. The
Committees also submit detailed intrusive written questions
to the nominee on every subject conceivable. The Wall Street
Journal performed an inestimable public service by publish-
ing a copy of the questionnaire submitted to Clarence
Thomas. Many of us would withdraw in despair after reading
even a portion of this interrogatory (by the way, the Senate
Judiciary Committee's reaction to the outrage generated by
their questionnaire was to complain about the leak that al-
lowed their behavior to be exposed-that sounds like the
KGB complaining about an invasion of its privacy).
The purpose of this tactic is obvious. It harasses and dis-
courages the candidate and it gives the Committee staff a
mountain of material in which to search for an errant word
or phrase with which to hang the nominee. It is a win/win
situation for the Committee because if the nominee objects
or fails to produce every letter, speech, brief or statement
ever written, or to answer even the most intrusive of: obnox-
ious question, the candidate can be accused of stonewalling
2 Id.
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or coveringup.
3. Terrorism. The Senators unleash their staff on the nomi-
nee. Heaven knows there are enough of them. Thirty-seven
thousand people work for Congress. There are plenty left
over from overseeing the executive departments and solicit-
ing campaign contributions to engage in investigations of
candidates for judicial or executive positions. What do these
people do? As we all know, and as Juan Williams of the Wash-
ington Post revealed, they spent their summer looking for dirt
on Clarence Thomas. I'm not sure whether this is training
for post-government jobs with the National Enquirer or
whether the National Enquirer jobs come first. Rumor, gossip,
innuendo and speculation was swept up by hundreds of vac-
uum cleaners and examined under a thousand microscopes.
Who among us could survive this process? It is an incredible
tribute to Clarence Thomas that these armies were able to
produce little in the way of scandal beyond a ten-year-old
unasserted charge of sexual harassment involving no touch-
ing, no job retaliation and no pressure for dates or sexual
favors-and a few shameful expressions of reverence for the
Declaration of Independence.
4. Form Alliances. Engage the interest groups. There are or-
ganizations out there whose existence depends on Robert
Borks and Clarence Thomas's. They raise funds and employ
lawyers and drum beaters for the primary purpose of invad-
ing the privacy and assailing the integrity of people like Clar-
ence Thomas. Naturally they give themselves names like
"People for the American Way" and "The Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights." The "American Way" they envision
certainly contains no civil rights, privacy or sense of fair play
for the targets of their campaigns.
5. Engage Other Organizations. Retain the American Bar Asso-
ciation. Even if the ABA-whose role in this process was ir-
revocably tainted by its performance in the Bork confirma-
tion-determines that a candidate is qualified, some
unidentified member of the Committee will dissent, thus fa-
Juan Williams, Open Season on Clarence Thomas, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1991, at A23.
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cilitating the claim that the legal profession is "divided." Or
the claim will be made that the candidate failed to achieve
the ABA's highest rating-which is generally reserved for
trial lawyers who are part of the same ABA elite who so vig-
orously oppose even a modicum of civil justice system reform.
6. Mobilize the Press. First, strike from your minds any notion
that the press is neutral. The vast majority of the reporters
that cover Washington, as any number of surveys have
shown, are very liberal-much more liberal than the Ameri-
can public. And we know by hearing what is said in pri-
vate-not to mention what we see and hear over the air-
waves-that the press was in a frenzy this summer to be the
first to find and reveal some scandal involving Clarence
Thomas. The coverage of the Thomas nomination was so
hysterically biased that any effort to conceal it was forgotten.
And we saw this summer the synergistic orchestration of
press, Senate staff and interest groups working in resonance
to bring Clarence Thomas down.
7. Interrogation. Sometimes this backfires, as it did with Clar-
ence Thomas. But days of argumentative, confusing, pedantic
and demagogic questioning can wear a candidate down, make
him look bad, or induce some small mistake. His answers may
make his interrogators look stupid, in which case he is per-
ceived as arrogant (and therefore unworthy), or he may ap-
pear tired or angry, and therefore be deemed to lack judicial
temperament. Or an inconsistency, however small, might be
discovered that would provide an excuse for questions of
credibility and character, or allow an accusation that the can-
didate had experienced a "confirmation conversion." Finally,
the candidate might make a statement. that is pleasing to his
questioners, but alienating to his supporters.
I. WHAT IS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF ALL THIS?
1. Candidates whose views are strong, penetrating and persua-
sive will be defeated because they are too formidable. Anyone
who has been willing to write or speak a great deal, to engage in
the marketplace of ideas, to put one's ideas to the test of scrutiny
249
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and criticism, to explore creative solutions or novel approaches,
and to depart from the "politically correct "mainstream" can
easily be savaged. Thus, the exact kinds of persons that we want
in public office are defeated precisely because of their robust, en-
ergetic involvement in the public arena.
2. No subject is off limits. During the past ten years we have
heard allegations, many never proven, many blown completely out
of proportion, regarding former spouses; relationships in the
workplace; private encounters with drugs, medication, or alcohol;
health problems; psychiatric care; private clubs-or sending one's
children to private schools; the legal problems of spouses, ex-
spouses, children and other relatives; and guilt by association. We
even have to explore which movies a candidate sees or books he
reads. In Clarence Thomas' case, we even heard critics make
snide and despicable comments on the significance of his interra-
cial marriage. The only persons who can go through this process
are those who are willing to sacrifice virtually any sense of privacy
or who have led a life untainted by any exposure to the normal
weaknesses that have some effect, some time, on virtually every
one of us.
3. It has been fatal to take positions on almost any topic of im-
portance or merit. Being for or against abortion, Roe v. Wade,"
affirmative action, or even the Declaration of Independence can
be dangerous. We have now learned that it is just as bad not to
have a position on Roe v. Wade as it is to have one. And if you've
ever changed a position, you are disqualified because you are ei-
ther a liar, a hypocrite, or have experienced a "confirmation
conversion."
It was not intended to be this way. The Framers did not antici-
pate that the Senate would use the confirmation process to de-
stroy candidates and bring disrespect on governmental institutions
and leaders or to share equally in the appointment power. In Fed-
eralist No. 65, entitled "The Senate: Appointments and Impeach-
ments," the entire text is devoted to the impeachment power with
the exception of this sentence:
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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[I]n the business of appointments the executive will be the
principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most prop-
erly be discussed in the examination of that department. 5
In Federalist No. 76, where the subject is discussed under the
title "The President and the Appointing Power," Alexander
Hamilton explained that the primary and principal power of ap-
pointment was to be with the President.6 It was most emphatically
not to be a shared power of appointment because:
[o]ne man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and esti-
mate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices ....
A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot
be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings,
and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolu-
tions of a collective body . . . [I]n every exercise of the
power of appointing . . . by an assembly of men, we must
expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings
and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and ani-
mosities, which are felt by those who compose the assembly.
The choice which may at any time happen to be made under
such circumstances, will of course be the result either of a
victory gained by one party or the other, or of a compromise
between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the
candidate will be too often out of sight . .. and it will rarely
happen that the advancement of the public service will be the
primary object either of party victories or of party
negotiations. 7
Therefore, the primary power was given to the President, and
the Framers did not believe that it was "very probable that [the
President's] nomination would often be overruled ... where there
were not special and strong reasons for the refusal."' James
Madison stated that the Senate's role was to prevent "any flagrant
partiality or error. '
I THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
Id. No. 76, at 480.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
James Madison (July 21, 1787) in II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
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As we have seen, the Senate has roamed far beyond the limited
check contemplated by the Framers. In fact, it has used its advice
and consent role to wrest from the President a substantial part of
his power to appoint district court, and to a certain extent, circuit
court judges. In the case of cabinet officials and Supreme Court
Justices, the process indeed has occasionally become what Clar-
ence Thomas quite correctly described as a "lynching."1 In An-
glo-Saxon England, lynching, called by other names, was not only
legal, it was obligatory." If a criminal act was perceived to occur,
the community was duty bound to give chase and to kill the cul-
prit. 2 As one author describes it, it is very much like what we
have just seen:
It was more than sport; it was. an instrument of government.
But it was also sport, and there has probably never been a
more popular one. Here was homicide without risk-either
from its victim, he being so outnumbered, or from the law,
which did not scold, but instead approved, indeed demanded,
so that conscience could not spoil the fun.' 3
But what we also see in the Senate destruction process is the
modern equivalent of another primitive and cruel process-trial
by ordeal. One popular ordeal, called ordeal by water, involved
binding the accused and throwing him in a pond. 4 If the accused
sank, he was innocent; if he floated, he was guilty. 5 Ordeal by
water was very much a no-win proposition, you were guilty and
alive-or innocent and dead.' 6 Very much like what Clarence
Thomas experienced. In many respects, however, it was more fair.
Perhaps we ought to consider switching to something like this. At
least we would not have a lot of innocent survivors around to re-
at 80 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (emphasis added).
10 See CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 93 (1980). The term "lynching" does not
necessarily have a racial connotation. Id. It was derived from Charles Lynch, an American
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mind us of what we have done.
II. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THIS?
Probably very little. The only hope is for the American public
to rise up and show their disgust with the process and bring about
an end to immunized character assassinations. However, while we
are holding our breath for this to happen, I have the following
additional and equally improbable suggestions:
1. The President's investigation of the candidate, through the
FBI, should not be shared at all with the Senate. As Attorney
General, and later Justice, Robert Jackson said:
Disclosure of information contained in the reports [would] be
the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investi-
gative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes
even the statements of malicious or misinformed people.
Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the
individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might
constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know that a cor-
rection never catches up with an accusation."
These reports constitute the President's investigation of the Pres-
ident's nominee and, prior to recent years, were not generally
shared with the Senate. Since the sharing process began, it has
been systematically abused to inflict grave injury on innocent per-
sons. And this return to the prior model would not justify the
Senate establishing its own FBI. The Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot be stretched that far.
2. As the President recently suggested, the time between nomi-
nation and confirmation should be shortened materially."8 Even
six weeks is too long, particularly where the nominee has been
previously confirmed by the Senate one, two or three or four
times, as in the case of Reynolds, Bork, Thomas, etc. Perhaps we
should have a rule that an appointment is confirmed without a
vote if a candidate is not rejected within a certain period. Sort of
'7 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 47 (1941).
President George Bush, supra note 1.
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a reverse pocket veto. You can imagine how much the Senate
would like that.
3. The President should not let up on Congress until it adopts
laws that protect privacy and enable criminal law punishment of
leaks (not informal rules or standards to be enforced by a Senate
or House Ethics Committee-which have never inflicted serious
punishment and never will). The notion that this would violate
separation of powers is nonsense. Congress has passed laws requir-
ing the Executive to prosecute executive branch officials who vio-
late the prerogatives of Congress. It can certainly allow those
same laws to be enforced against its own employees and members.
4. Nominees should be advised that personal and private sub-
jects are off limits and to decline to discuss such matters absent a
clear, specific, and credible claim that they may have violated
some law. They should also continue to refrain from discussing
how they would rule in cases that might come before them.
5. The ABA and all other self-serving interest groups should be
deleted from the process. What makes the ABA particularly quali-
fied to judge Supreme Court candidates? And who elects the judi-
cial evaluation committee?
6. I hope that the President will not be reluctant to continue to
nominate strong, principled and experienced individuals. Robert
Bork, in a losing cause, and Clarence Thomas, in a more success-
ful one, showed that a great deal can be gained by letting intelli-
gent, articulate conservatives appear on television before the
American people. The messages they have to convey are potent
and persuasive and the President should take advantage of the op-
portunity these hearings present. For one, I flatly reject the no-
tion that the President should nominate so-called "centrists" or
even liberals, as Stuart Taylor advocates in the American Lawyer.19
The debate that will ensue when the President nominates another
Bork or Scalia is a splendid opportunity because the more their
ideas are heard without the filter Of an unsympathetic press, the
' Stuart Taylor, Supreme Disappointment; What's Really Wrong with the Way We Choose Su-
preme Court Justices, AM. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 5.
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more their ideas will be understood and accepted.
7. In a more generic vein, serious consideration should be given
to greater executive branch oversight of the legislature. Is it con-
stitutional to have 107 committees and subcommittees exercising
oversight over the Defense Department, but no executive branch
oversight over Congress? While such a concept is anathema to
Congress, a discussion of this subject might lead to greater atten-
tion to the abuses of legislative oversight over the Executive.
In the long run, very little will be done unless the public begins
to appreciate what has been done to corrupt and manipulate the
process in ways we are beginning to accept as a normal part of the
system. We are discouraging qualified and experienced people
from seeking public office and we are diminishing the authority of
those who survive the process and assume positions of leadership.
"Every nation has the government it deserves."2 If we want a
strong and effective government, we must stop trying to destroy
our most able and willing leaders. The President should not sur-
render any more of his constitutionally derived authority to nomi-
nate candidates for judicial office to those in the Senate who wish
to exercise the Executive's prerogatives, but who do not have the
public support necessary to win election to that office.
20 Ask the Globe, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1989, at 44 (citing MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS). Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), a French monarchist, wrote this pithy pro-
nouncement which first appeared in his Lettres et Opuscules Inedits on August 15, 1811. Id.
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